Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā
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Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to solve this problem through distinguishing between common and primary predications, application of two categories to knowledge from two essential and accidental aspects, negation of the subsistence of inherence, and acceptance of the application of two categories to cognitive form due to the mentally-positedness of quiddity, and the possibility of its shadow-like realization in the form of multiple existences. Although a study of his responses indicate their incompleteness in resolving the issue, his principles have paved the ground for accomplishing this task through accepting the “predication of the indicator on the indicated”. According to this view, regardless of what the nature and category of the cognitive form is, the narration of the nature of an external thing is introduced as the ontological attribute of the cognitive form, which has nothing to do with its nature and is, rather, outside the realm of categories. Through this solution, we can both maintain the correspondence between the cognitive form and the nature of the external thing and, while accepting the realization of the cognitive form in the mind, resolve the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories.
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